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PRUDENCE OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES' COAL CONTRACTS




Prudence reviews of public utility decisions by regulatory commissions are
not a recent phenomenon.' There, however, has been a sharp increase in the
number and scope of such reviews conducted in the electric utility industry. 2 In
recent years, a number of regulatory commissions, recognizing that fuel costs are
one of the largest single factors in utility rate increases, 3 have examined utilities'
fuel procurement practices in general and fuel contracts in particular to determine
whether such practices and contracts are "prudent." ' 4 Several state commissions
have held that specific contracts or contract clauses are imprudent and have dis-
allowed significant fuel costs allegedly resulting from such imprudence. Other
commissions have begun investigating utilities' procurement policies and proce-
dures as a whole, and some have even issued guidelines covering virtually every
aspect of fuel procurement.
These actions by state regulatory commissions have caused utilities to take
certain steps that will effect the negotiation and administration of coal contracts.
* Associate, Hunton & Williams, Washington, D.C.; B.A. 1978, Michigan State University;
J.D. 1980, University of Michigan.
This work originally appeared as a part of the proceedings of the National Coal Association's
Coal Lawyers Conference (Scottsdale, Arizona, Oct. 15-19, 1986).
'In one of the earliest reported cases, Re Kohala Ditch Co., 1922A Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 1
(Ha. P.S.C. 1921), the Hawaiian Public Utilities Commission reviewed whether a water supply ditch
was constructed larger than was justified by the available water supply.
2 In October 1985, ELECTRICAL WORLD reported that thirty-five prudence reviews had been con-
ducted in the electric utility industry since 1980. This is almost 400% more than in the previous forty
years. What Will You Do When Prudence Arrives?, 199 ELECTUCAL WORLD 85 (Oct. 1985). Most
of these reviews have dealt with the prudence of costs incurred in the construction of nuclear power
plants, but reviews of procurement decisions are becoming increasingly common.
A 1983 article in PUBLIC UTrLrrTEs FORTNIGHTLY states that since 1965, the cost of electricity
has risen at an annual rate of 7.6% (in current dollars). Since 1973, however, the annual increase
has averaged 13.7%. The major cause of this increase has been the average annual 23.4% increase
(in current dollars) in fossil fuel costs since 1973. Fossil fuel has increased from 69.4% of electric
utilities production costs in 1965 to 78.6% in 1981. Gibbons, Fuel Procurement-A Changing Re-
sponsibility, 112 PUBLIC UamrrEas FORTNIGHTLY 25, 27 (1983).
4 Regulatory review of procurement practices and fuel contracts may be in the context of either
a prudence review or a management audit.
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For example, some utilities have adopted written procurement policies which, in
turn, will force the utilities to document adherence to these policies or to justify
any departure from them. In addition, in response to pressure from state com-
missions, utilities probably will seek to enforce their contract rights more vig-
orously and will attempt to negotiate contracts that give them greater flexibility
as to the quantity, quality, and price of coal.
This Article examines several recent regulatory decisions regarding the prud-
ence of electric utilities' coal contracts and fuel procurement practices and the
impact of these decisions on the negotiation of contracts between coal suppliers
and electric utilities.
II. SURVEY OF RECENT REGULATORY DECISIONS INVOLVING COAL CONTRACTS
A. Review by Public Service Commissions of Individual Coal Contracts
Utility commissions are becoming increasingly critical of management deci-
sions regarding fuel procurement. For example, in Metropolitan Edison Co. v.
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission,5 the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
affirmed in part an order of the Public Utility Commission directing a refund to
Metropolitan Edison's ("Met Ed's") customers of more than $4.6 million. The
court, however, remanded the case to the Commission to make specific findings
of fact as to the part of the ordered refund which was based on surcharges. The
Commission held that Met Ed failed to exercise managerial prudence in the admin-
istration of three coal contracts by agreeing in 1974 to pay to coal suppliers prices
higher than required by the original contracts. Met Ed stated that "its decision
to accede to the brokers' demands foi higher prices was sound business judgment
in light of 'the runaway coal market created by the Arab oil embargo.' "1 The
court summarized Met Ed's perceived options as either to "(1) demand strict
adherence to contract terms, coupled with a threat of legal action; or (2) negotiate
contract modifications. ' 7 Met Ed argued that legal action was not a practical
remedy and might have imperiled the utility's service to its customers. Met Ed
also asserted that if it had refused to renegotiate the contract prices, it would
have been forced to seek substitute coal in an "at least equally expensive 'spot
market.' "8 The Commission rejected these contentions, finding that Met Ed un-
reasonably had failed to enforce its contractual rights by not limiting the price
increases to actual increases in the cost of coal production provided for in the
contracts. Furthermore, it found that Met Ed had made little, if any, meaningful
I Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 62 Pa. Conumw. 461, 437 A.2d
76 (1981).
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effort to ascertain whether the price increases demanded by the coal suppliers
wre justified by the production costs of the coal.
In 1982, the Delaware Public Service Commission assessed damages of $2.26
million against Delmarva Power and Light Company for imprudence in purchasing
coal under long-term contracts for its Indian River plant.9 The Commission spe-
cifically criticized Delmarva's:
(1) use of a price escalator based on a combination of the Consumer Price
Index and the Wholesale Price Index, which caused the contract price to exceed
the market price, without securing protection against excessive price increases;
(2) decision to enter into a second coal contract with a supplier who had
previously defaulted on a similar contract;
(3) failure to negotiate a more favorable price with a supplier in light of the
coal company's need for Delmarva's business;
(4) waiver without consideration of a right to insist that coal not delivered
by one of the suppliers be made up;
(5) failure to be more flexible in a changing market;
(6) failure to have more skilled and knowledgeable negotiators; and
(7) failure to have a written policy governing coal purchases.',
The Delaware Superior Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Com-
mission's disallowances," holding that the Commission's determination of im-
prudence in the use of an unprecedented price escalator in one of the coal contracts
was justified because (1) the escalator was not based on coal production costs,
but on indices driven by rapidly escalating oil prices resulting primarily from the
Arab oil embargo and (2) there was no cap or ceiling on the escalator clause.'
2
The court also affirmed the Commission's determination of imprudence as to
" In re Application of Delmarva Power & Light Co., No. 81-39 (Del. P.S.C. Apr. 12, 1982).
10 Delmarva countered that (1) it had at all times employed a competitive bidding process, (2)
contracts had always been awarded to the lowest qualified bidder, (3) all contract negotiations had
been conducted at arm's length, (4) no fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing had been alleged or proved,
and (5) despite the massive price and supply disruptions which had affected the energy markets during
the period in question, the actual price paid by Delmarva for low-sulfur compliance coal was rea-
sonable. The Commission was unpersuaded by these arguments.
11 In re Application of Delmarva Power & Light Co., 486 A.2d 19 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984), rev'd,
508 A.2d 849 (Del. 1986). The court reversed the Commission's disallowance of (1) $2 per ton because
the Commission's finding that the volatility factor in the coal was reflected in heat output rested on
an "uncertain foundation" and (2) $3 per ton on the grounds that the Commission's determination
that the price Delmarva paid was too high in view of the coal company's weak bargaining position
was not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 32.
22 Id. at 27-28.
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Delmarva's decision not to make up deliveries interrupted by a mine labor strike,
but instead, to purchase higher-priced spot market coal. 3
The Supreme Court of Delaware recently reversed the Superior Court's de-
cision on the ground that it was based on an erroneous standard of "prudence.'
14
The court remanded the case to the Commission to make new findings based on
the proper standard of review (i.e., the Commission would be required to allow
all expenses legitimately and properly incurred which the Commission had not
demonstrated to have resulted from "abuse of discretion, bad faith or waste"). 5
Even though the Commission's application of the prudence standard was reversed,
this case demonstrates the new activism of regulatory commissions in reviewing
utility management decisions in the area of fuel procurement.
The Florida Public Service Commission has held that Gulf Power Company
acted inprudently in renewing a multiple-year coal contract for the full-term and
not terminating the relationship when the price of coal provided for under the
contract exceeded the price of alternate fuel sources.' 6 The Commission required
refunds of more than $2.5 million for the three years in which the contract price
exceeded the weighted average market price of comparable coal. The Commission
ordered Gulf Power to refund an additional $100,000 because it did not request
British thermal unit ("Btu") adjustments to which it was entitled under the con-
tract for the coal company's failure to properly dewater the coal. This decision
In reaching its decision, the court applied the following standard:
The basic standard which evolves then is one of reasonable care under the circumstances
but, because of the special trust-like relationship which a public utility bears to its customers,
the utility is required to exercise skill and caution in the expenditure of funds so as to
minimize the risk that its ratepayers will suffer through mismanagement. Whether this ob-
ligation when exercised in the area of fuel purchases be viewed as "special," a designation
which Delmarva disputes, is not important. Because the fuel adjustment clause provides the
utility with a quick and relatively inexpensive alternative to rate increase proceedings and
in view of the size of the expenditures sought to be passed on to ratepayers, the utility is
required to exercise a degree of skill and caution commensurate with the magnitude of the
risk. This standard requires that the utility know what skillful persons knowledgeable in
the area of fuel purchases should know and that it act to recognize and guard against
potential problems. It is not chargeable with predicting future events but it is charged with
foreseeing those problems which skillful persons might reasonably anticipate and, in the
exercise of caution, protect against their consequences.
Id. at 26.
'4 Delmarva Power & Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 508 A.2d 849, 860 (Del. 1986).
Is Id.
16 Re Investigation of Fuel Cost Recovery Clauses of Electric Utilities, No. 820001-EU-A, Order
No. 13452 (Fla. P.S.C. June 22, 1984). The utility's witnesses testified, however, that Gulf Power
did not have the right to terminate the contract unless it had "good cause," which it did not believe
it had in this instance. The Commission dismissed this argument, stating that "It]here is no evidence
of record to show that Gulf [Power] actually sought to have the contract terminated or that it sought
to determine whether termination was a possible option." Id. at 7.
[Vol. 89
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was upheld by the Florida Supreme Court in Gulf Power Co. v. Florida Public
Service Commission.
7
In June 1985, the Ohio Public Utilities Commission ordered Cincinnati Gas
and Electric Company ("CG&E") to refund over $1.5 million to its customers
for money spent on coal stockpiled in anticipation of a 1984 United Mine Work-
ers' strike. 8 The Commission found that CG&E's purchase of higher-priced coal
from contract suppliers, as opposed to spot market purchases, was not "fair, just
and reasonable." However, the Commission stated that the record did not support
a finding that (1) CG&E's receipt of make up in quantity due to force majeure
events and (2) the exercise of its option under the contract to take a ten percent
reduction of monthly quantities was unreasonable. The Commission ordered CG&E
to provide more thorough documentation of its fuel procurement strategies, and
admonished the utility to "exercise flexibility in its coal procurement practices in
order to maximize economic benefits to its customers."' 9
B. Review of Utilities' Fuel Purchasing Policies and Practices Generally
Regulatory commissions have broadened their review of utilities' fuel decisions
to include fuel procurement policies and practices generally. For example, in the
early 1980s, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commisison ("FERC"), in Virginia
Electric and Power Co., 20 conducted a sweeping private investigation of the man-
agement prudence of Virginia Electric and Power Company, specifically examining
the utility's negotiation and administration of four coal contracts. The matter
was resolved upon FERC's direction that Virginia Electric and Power report every
six months for three years on its progress in controlling costs and prudently man-
aging in the area, among others, of coal procurement. A special audit committee
of FERC was established to review these periodic reports.
2'
In a 1982 rate proceeding, the District of Columbia Public Service Com-
mission examined whether Potomac Electric Power Company ("PEPCO") had
17 Gulf Power Co. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 487 So.2d 1036 (Fla. 1986).
" In re Regulation of the Electric Fuel Component contained within the Rate Schedules of the
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co., No. 84-13-EL-EFC (Ohio P.S.C. June 26, 1985). This decision was
pursuant to an Ohio statute that requires the Commission to review each electric utility's fuel com-
ponent once every six months. As part of that review, the Commission examined (1) whether CG&E
was taking sufficient initiative to procure as much Ohio coal as was economically, technically, and
environmentally possible, (2) whether CG&E's decision to renegotiate a long-term contract with one
of its suppliers was reasonable in light of the poor performance of the supplier in meeting quality
and quantity requirements, (3) whether a sulfur bonus/penalty provision was advantageous to CG&E,
and (4) the percentage of coal purchased by CG&E under contracts versus that purchased on the spot
market.
19 Id. at 13.
: Virginia Electric and Power Co., No. IN80-14 (Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Mar. 14, 1980).
21 Virginia Electric and Power Co., 19 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61, 333 (1982).
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minimized fuel costs during the test year and followed prudent and cost mini-
mizing fuel procurement practices. 22 Although the Commission concluded that
PEPCO's fuel procurement policies, which "emphasize the need for flexibility,"
were effective, the Commission recommended that PEPCO document more thor-
oughly the reasons for variances between ordered and received quantities of fuel.2 3
The Commission further noted that while in the past PEPCO had delayed the
processing of Btu adjustments in its coal contracts, this backlog had been elim-
inated and thus, no further action was recommended with respect to this issue. 24
In Re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.,'- the New York Public Service Com-
mission, pursuant to a statewide investigation into issues concerning the fuel ad-
justment clause, analyzed the fuel purchasing practices of Niagara Mohawk Power.
The Commission staff contended that Niagara Mohawk should implement an
enforceable contractual standard on the acceptable amount of undersized coal or
"coal fines." It also objected to the utility's practice of purchasing coal by weight
(which would necessarily include any water, miscellaneous mine matter, and refuse
contained in the coal), rather than on a Btu basis. The staff presented evidence
of Niagara Mohawk's coal sampling practices which failed to comply with the
American Society for Testing and Materials standards, contending that such prac-
tices contributed to the utility's inability to obtain coal from suppliers that met
contract specifications. The Commission found that Niagara Mohawk's sampling
practices had improved considerably, but to enhance the enforceability of contract
specifications, the utility should consider purchasing coal on a Btu basis rather
than on a weight basis.
Some state commissions have gone so far as to adopt guidelines with respect
to fuel procurement. For example, on March 24, 1977, the Pennsylvania Public
Utility Commission adopted an order promulgating guidelines on fuel procurement
policies for electric utilities. 26 The purpose of the guidelines was to prevent the
pass-through to utility ratepayers under fuel adjustment clauses of excessive pur-
chase costs for coal and petroleum fuels. The guidelines contained
recommendations 27 on virtually every aspect of fuel procurement, including:
21 Re Potomac Electric Power Co., 50 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 500, 547 (D.C.P.S.C. 1982).
During the period in question, 91% of contracted for coal was received. In some instances,
plant outages lessened the need for coal. In addition, dissatisfaction with a coal supplier caused PEPCO
to cancel shipments. The Commission noted that "lilt would be difficult on this record to fault PEPCO
on the delivery shortfall issue." Id. at 550.
2 Id. at 548.
11 Re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 56 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 315 (N.Y.P.S.C. 1983).
2 52 PA. CODE §§ 69.1, 69.7 (1986).
" The Commission declined to make the guidelines mandatory, stating:
[The Commission] has found that mandatory regulations, as opposed to guidelines, might
tend to straight-jacket previously unregulated economic relationships between regulated util-
ities and non-regulated coal vendors which are largely a function of comparative bargaining
power, and thus become a detriment to the interest of utilities' customers instead of the
[Vol. 89
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(1) The organization and operation of utility staff involved in fuel procure-
ment;
(2) fuel purchasing strategies that stimulate competition among numerous ven-
dors, including small volume suppliers, and provide "lowest reasonable cost with
maximum flexibility";
(3) achieving a balance of long-term, short-term, and spot purchases of fuel;
(4) sampling procedures and the inclusion of bonus/penalty provisions for
Btu, moisture, ash, and sulfur content;
(5) the need for documentation of a utility's reasons for rejecting bids;
(6) investigations to insure that potential vendors have adequate "owned" or
"contracted" supplies to fulfill all contract requirements;
(7) seeking contracts with greater ranges in minimum/maximum tonnage re-
quirements to be exercised at the utility's discretion;
(8) including escalation and de-escalation clauses in long-term contracts based
on measurable supplier costs, not market prices;
(9) the inclusion of audit clauses in all contracts that provide for cost es-
calation; and
(10) the review of contracts, escalation clauses, and terms of fuel purchase
agreements by legal counsel.
As the above summary indicates, regulatory agencies' increased scrutiny of
electric utilities' fuel procurement decisions, policies, and practices has had an
effect on the way in which utilities purchase fuel. The following section addresses
the effect of such increased regulatory scrutiny on companies in contract nego-
tiations and in dealings with electric utilities. Although these observations may
not necessarily reflect the practice of the electric utility industry as a whole, they
are indications of the types of provisions some utilities have insisted on in con-
tracts and the changing attitude of the electric utility industry toward coal suppliers
in general.
III. IMPACT OF RECENT DECISIONS ON COAL CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS
A. Utilities Tougher in Negotiations and Contract Enforcement
With increased regulatory scrutiny of utilities' coal contracts and procurement
practices, electric utilities have become more knowledgeable about coal markets
intended protection. However, utilities will be called upon to provide proper justification
for any deviation from Commission guidelines.
7 Pa. Bull. 1087 (1977).
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and negotiating coal contracts. Partially in response to pressure from state com-
missions,2 utilities are devoting more resources to (1) hiring in-house and outside
experts on fuel procurement, (2) educating and training employees as to pro-
curement issues and negotiation techniques, and (3) using or developing sophis-
ticated computer models and other contract evaluation techniques.
In addition, utilities have become more aggressive in enforcing their contract
rights, particularly with respect to coal quality. 29 Stricter quality control is usually
sought in the form of increased use and enforcement of adjustments for quality
variations (e.g., 3tu, sulfur, and ash penalties) or more stringent sampling pro-
visions. Utilities also are expanding their contractual remedies for delivery of
nonconforming coal to include (1) demanding assurances from a supplier that
any quality deviations have been corrected and will not recur, (2) refusing to
accept further shipments of coal until the supplier demonstrates to the utility's
satisfaction that the coal meets contract requirements, and (3) canceling the con-
tract or seeking specific performance if the supplier fails or refuses to provide
the requested assurances or continues to ship nonconforming coal for a specified
period. Some utilities have gone even further and have made each specification
a material provision of their coal contracts. Consequently, the failure of any coal
shipment to comply with any one specification is a material breach of the contract
and grounds for rejection of that shipment and, perhaps cancellation of the entire
contract.
B. Utilities Include Contract Provisions to Increase Purchasing
Flexibility
The trend of public service commission scrutinization of individual coal con-
tracts, coupled with the movement toward building smaller generating units, has
caused some utilities to enter into shorter-term contracts to avoid being locked
into arrangements preventing them from taking advantage of decreases in the
market price. In addition, utilities may contract for the supply of only a portion
of an electric generating station's or unit's coal requirements instead of its total
fuel requirements. This further increases contract flexibility by reserving to the
28 As noted above, Delmarva Power & Light was critized in 1982 by the Delaware Public Service
Commission for (1) failing to negotiate a more favorable price with a coal supplier in light of that
supplier's need for Delmarva's business and (2) failing to have more skilled and knowledgeable ne-
gotiators in general. Specifically, the Commission found that (1) the principal contract negotiator for
Delmarva had not actually negotiated a coal contract previously and (2) Delmarva had failed to obtain
legal counsel to advise it as to its contract rights. See In re Application of Delmarva Power & Light
Company, No. 81-39, Findings and Recommendations of Hearing Examiner, at 24, 37.
29 Both Metropolitan Edison and Gulf Power Company have been criticized by their state com-
missions for failing to enforce their contract rights as to limitations on price increases and Btu ad-
justments, respectively. See discussion, supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text as well as notes 16,
17 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 89
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utility the right to purchase some coal from other suppliers and, in some cases,
to switch fuels altogether.
Coal companies also can expect utilities to bargain for the inclusion of various
types of "escape" clauses. For example, some utilities are attempting to negotiate
ceilings or caps on the price of coal. In addition, they may ask for price reopener
provisions allowing them to renegotiate the contract if the contract price sub-
stantially departs from the market price of coal. 0 Cost reimbursement pricing
arrangements probably will be avoided in favor of fixed price contracts or con-
tracts with "initial" or "base" prices subject to adjustment in accordance with
some reliable (usually government) indexes. Paradoxically, while utilities will de-
mand more contract flexibility from their coal suppliers, once a regulatory agency
has "blessed" a particular contract provision or set of terms, coal companies may
find utilities extremely reluctant to deviate from these for fear of incurring re-
newed regulatory criticism.3 In essence, regulatory commissions may become silent
partners at the negotiating table.
Some utilities have argued that certain regulatory actions may allow them to
avoid unfavorable long-term coal contracts. In 1985, Northern Indiana Public
Service Commission ("NIPSCO") attempted to avoid its long-term contract with
Carbon County Coal Company on the ground that an order by the Indiana Public
Service Commission prohibiting an increase in the fuel adjustment factor con-
stituted an event of force majeure, thus the utility was excused from performing.
The coal company sued and was awarded $181 million on the ground that NIP-
SCO had breached its contract because the Public Service Commission order did
not prevent NIPSCO from using the coal; it merely prevented it from passing
the cost of the coal on to its ratepayers.
32
In a similar case, Houston Lighting and Power Company ("HL&P") sued
two of its major coal suppliers, alleging that their contracts with these suppliers
allowed HL&P to refuse to pay a price higher than that deemed by the Texas
"' Although the exact wording of reopener provisions varies greatly, they are basically of two
types: (1) those that provide that the parties will be bound by a market price determined in accordance
with applicable procedures and (2) those that provide that if either party is dissatisfied with the market
price thus determined, that party can terminate the contract. From the utility's perspective, the type
of reopener provision preferred will depend on whether the utility is trying to insure a continuous
supply of coal (in which case the former type may be preferable) or whether its primary interest is
in minimizing the price it pays for coal (in which case the latter type may be more favorable).
"1 One industry expert has suggested that utilities are going to have to "take the initiative to
obtain the cooperation of the commissions and in the future, commissions are going to have to 'buy'
into the utility decisions and take some responsibility for those decisions .... What Will You Do
When Prudence Arrives?, 199 ELECTRICAL WORLD 79 (Nov. 1985) (quoting Leonard R. Wass, Vice
President of Cresap, McCormick & Paget, a Chicago-based management consulting firm for the utility
industry).
" Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., No. H-85-390, slip op. (N.D.
Ind. Oct. 11, 1985).
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Public Utility commission to be "prudent," and therefore allowed to be passed
through to ratepayers.33 This suit is in response to the Texas Commission's de-
cision to scrutinize the prudence of HL&P's coal contracts. During the course of
the utility's annual rate proceeding, a member of the Commission staff testified
that $1.51/MBtu "seemed like a reasonable limit" on the price of coal.34 In re-
sponse, HL&P has indicated it may withhold in escrow an estimated $100 million
annually in payments under the two long-term coal contracts. This amount rep-
resents the difference between $1.51/MBtu and the price HL&P is paying under
the contracts (i.e., in excess of $2/MBtu).
Additionally, in response to increased regulatory demand for contract flex-
ibility and to the more stringent air pollution regulations enacted in the late 1970s,
many utilities now insist on clauses providing that if the utility is required to
burn coal with specifications different from those stated in the contract, then the
utility can request the supplier to provide coal that meets the required specifi-
cations. If the supplier is unable to supply such coal, then the utility can terminate
the contract. The current regulatory climate and the spectre of acid rain legislation
and other proposed antipollution measures virtually insure that utilities will con-
tinue to insist on these types of clauses.
IV. CONCLUSION: A LOOK INTO THE FUTURE
Increased regulatory scrutiny of fuel procurement decisions, policies, and
practices has caused electric utilities to take certain precautionary measures. These
measures, in turn, will affect utilities' contract negotiations and dealings with coal
suppliers. The success of utilities in obtaining concessions from coal suppliers on
particular issues will be primarily a function of the market and the strength of
the utilities' bargaining positions. The nature and extent of commission review
of utilities' fuel procurement contracts and practices will vary from state to state
and will depend, to some extent, on the strength of third party opposition. If
the market shifts once again in the coal suppliers' favor, regulatory commissions
may be forced to relax their scrutiny of utilities' fuel procurement decisions. Coal
companies should assume, however, that utilities will continue to seek concessions
from suppliers, irrespective of the market and the strength of the utilities' bar-
gaining power, to avoid regulatory and public criticism. At a minimum, utilities
will be required to document their decision-making process by demonstrating that
(1) they solicited bids from as large a number of coal suppliers as possible and
(2) they attempted to negotiate favorable contract provisions.
31 See Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Kerr-McGee Coal Corp., No. CA3-86-1755-R, slip op.
(N.D. Dallas June 30, 1986). See also ELECTRIC UTMITY WEEK 1-2 (July 21, 1986).
Although the basis for this figure is unclear, it is apparently based on an alleged price ne-
gotiated between the coal supplier in question and another utility.
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